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IN the past two decades developing countries have invested an in-
creasing proportion of their resources in new industries and the infra-
structure needed to support them. Many of the new industries have
been light, simple, and consumer oriented. But a significant number
of less developed countries (LDC's), mostly the larger and richer ones,
have established heavy, more complex capital goods industries. Both
sectors of industry have been largely oriented to the domestic market,
although there are some LDC's which have succeeded in sharply
increasing their industrial exports, mostly of light and simple products.
The absence of export success may in itself suggest the prevalence
of substantial price differentials and cast a doubt on the efficiency and
competitiveness of the new industries. The question has been raised in
several quarters whether, in fact, the resources spent on industrializa-
tion have been well spent or whether the LDC's could have achieved
more growth—in domestic product or export earnings—by a different
design of industrialization or by more emphasis on other sectors. These
questions are of special relevance for the newly established capital
goods industries, because:
1. Several LDC's which have not yet, or hardly, begun with heavy
industrialization are appraising the case for establishing capital goods
industries.
NoTE: This paper is in part based on research undertaken in the World Bank but
the views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
the bank. The author acknowledges comments received on an earlier version of this
article by Bela Balassa, Ayhan Cilingiroglu, Vinod Dubey, and Bertil Walstedt.336 Priceand Cost Differences
2. The investment outlays for capital goods industries and their re-
lated infrastructure are substantial and may impose severe strains on
the country's finances, leading to inflation and eventual impairment of
industrial efficiency.
3. While the growth of exports of light industrial products has in
some countries been promising, a. breakthrough of exports from the
larger LDC's (which have invested in heavy industry and had by and
large the poorer industrial export performance) will require exports
from the engineering and other capital goods industries. (See[5].)
When competitive, these industries can obtain the large orders that
will make for substantial and sustained export growth.
Questions about international price differentials and, more broadly,
the competitiveness of industry in the LDC's and the success of import
substitution as a development strategy have been extensively discussed
in the professional literature. There is now a growing body of empiri-
cal material, in particular on Latin American and Indian experience,
which can provide guidance to policy makers in these and other coun-
tries. This study adds to the empirical findings on international price
differentials prevailing in selected capital goods industries and then
discusses the main explanatory factors underlying the price difference
between LDC's and industrial countries.
THE NATURE AND LEVEL OF PRICE DIFFERENTIALS
The difference between LDC prices and prices of comparable com-
peting supplies is maintained with the help of a wide variety of meas-
ures inthe importing countries. The measures include outright
prohibition, quantitative restrictions, multiple exchange rates, and
restrictions on procurement for public or infrastructure projects. One
particular measure, common to many LDC's, is the requirement that
no import license be granted for products which are also produced
locally unless it can be demonstrated that the local product does not
suit the purpose of the user. The particular form or technique by
which price differentials are maintained may over time affect their
magnitudes, i.e., have an impact on the competitiveness of industry.
In this paper the differences in prices between imported and domestic
products will be called "protection." Thus, the paper disregards thePrice Comparisons of Capital Industries 337
particulartechnique of protection, and instead focuses on the magni-
tude and possible economic causes of the price differentials.
It is now generally recognized that in calculating protection a dis-
tinction must be made between gross or nominal protection and net
protection, i.e., protection of value added after allowing for the excess
cost (over international levels) or material inputs ([1],[2], and [3]).
These two measures make it possible to single out material input costs
as one important cost-raising factor.
For the LDC producer let
p =priceof final product
a =costof imported materials
b =costof domestic materials and supplies
c= valueadded
p =a+ b + candp' =a'+ b' + c',thecomparable prices and costs
of a representative foreign producer, expressed in the same currency as
p. etc., calculated at the applicable rate of exchange.
Gross protection is
=(a+ b + c)/(a'+b' + C')— 1.
Protection, assuming imported inputs at international prices,is
T2 =(a'+ b + c)/(a' + b' + c') —1.
Net protection is
T3 =(a'+ b' + c)/(a' + b' + c')— 1.
It will be noted that net protection is similar to "effective" protec-
tion T4, a measure which has recently been widely used (e.g.,[4]):
T4 =(c/c') — 1=(p'/c')T3
When either T3 or T4 is negative, but T1 is positive, the industry
can be export-competitive if appropriate allowance is made for excess
input costs.
The domestic resource cost per unit of foreign exchange saved, a
concept used by Bruno [3], is defined as (b + c)/(p'— a).
Thedifferences of the first three measures of protection, all expressed
as a proportion of the foreign price of the finished product, are:338 Priceand Cost Differences
T, —T2= and T2 —T3=Tb,where =(a — measuresthe
excess of the cost of the import component of materials over interna-
tional levels(i.e.,the prices paid by a representative foreign pro-
ducer). This excess may be caused by duties or other taxes or by imper-
fections in international prices or because purchases by LDC producers
are on a smaller scale than those of their competitors. Tb =(b—b')/p'
measures the excess of prices of domestically produced material and
supply inputs over comparable prices paid by producers in developed
countries.
In testing the competitiveness of LDC capital goods industries one
would like to have calculations for a wide range of individual products
at different times and in different countries. Such results cannot be
expected for some time, especially since these price data are not in-
cluded in regular statistical series. Instead, one has to resort to a com-
parison of fairly broad aggregates which may cover up points relevant
to certain policy decisions. An alternative would be comparisons over
time even if these are possible for only few products. This paper
presents price calculations for thirty products in four countries as of
approximately the same time (1966).
Table 1 presents the observations of a, b, a/p,b/p,and the four
measures of protection for products of the automotive, heavy electrical,
and mechanical equipment industries in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico
and Pakistan.'
Comparisons have been made between LDC prices of finished prod-
ucts and components and those prevailing in industrial countries
(converted to a c.i.f.—cost, insurance, and freight—import basis). For
the automotive industry, the comparison was between prices of home
plants and/or international manufacturers and their subsidiaries. For
the other industries, comparisons were made with import prices of
finished products in the LDC's and material input prices of representa-
tive producers in the industrial countries (again often parent com-
panies).
The data presented should be interpreted with care, considering in
particular that:
1Thissection draws on findings from field visits undertaken by Jack Baranson,
Ayhan Cilingiroglu, and José Datas-Panero, of the IBRD staff. Most of these will
be presented in more detail in [7] and [8].Price Comparisons of Capital Industries 339
1.Price data from both developed countries and LDC's change over
time. Most of the data presented here are based on information ob-
tained in 1966.
2. The coverage is limited and uneven.
3. Firms may quote different prices for the same or nearly the same
equipment, depending on their particular relations with the customer
or country. Price indications may vary with the source of the informa-
tion, e.g., as obtained from bid analysis or company interviews.
4. In practice, selection of a price for the purposecomparison
must allow for many factors, including delivery time, financing terms,
quality, performance, maintenance costs, etc.
Subject to these reservations one may draw the following general
conclusions:
1. The excess material costs account for a significant part of' gross
protection.
2. The protection rates, either gross or net (T1 or T3) show consider-.
able variation within individual countries.
3. Eliminating the excess material costs reduces the extent of varia-
tion: the T3 series has a smaller standard deviation (35.3) than the
T1 series (46.0).
4. Among the countries included, industry in Argentina has the
highest protection rates, both net and gross.
The effect of commonly recognized cost-raising factors on the vari-
ation in protection rates is less obvious and straightforward. The next
section discusses these factors in the light of the data and the experi-




In its early years an industrial firm is bound to incur special costs
associated with getting established. These costs include training of the
production workers and of the technical, administrative, and super-
visory force and management; expenses associated with the start-up of
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.342 Priceand Cost Differences
adaptation of the production process to local conditions; the opening
up of supplier industries.
After an initial in-training period for labor, management, and plant,
a firm producing heavy equipment will gradually upgrade the size
and quality of its product—at least part of this process may be regarded
as a starting up of the plant.
In the LDC's start-up costs will tend to be higher and they may
extend over a longer period of time than in advanced industrial na-
tions. In some cases start-up costs may exceed the cost of fixed plant.
The starting-up period cannot be defined with precision. It will vary
with countries, industries, and even firms.
An argument can be made for treating start-up cost separately in
calculating the cost of the industrial investment. Since much of this
cost will be peculiar to the conditions in the LDC, it may also be
argued that it should be treated somehow without being expressed in
the price paid by final users or in the price used for comparison with
import prices. Rarely, the start-up cost can be written off by the parent
firm. Part or all of the cost may be absorbed by the LDC government,
for example, in the form of an outright subsidy, exemption from taxes,
a participation in equity, or a loan on concessionary terms. If no spe-
cial arrangements are made, the start-up costs will increase the prod-
uct's price during the early years of the firm: the protection in those
years may be substantial.
The impact of start-up costs are difficult to trace in the data. Most
of the firms presented are in the latter part of the start-up period,
having been in production at least three or four years. Most of them
are also receiving special financing to cover at least part of the start-up
costs, e.g., tax holidays (e.g., Mexico) or financing at subsidized interest
rates (e.g., Brazil). No comparative analysis was made of the arrange-
ments for financing start-up cost. A substantial part was probably
absorbed by the parent company which, however, will expect a return
on its investment in later years.
Apparently Brazilian truck manufacturers received domestic inputs
at better prices than their counterparts in Argentina or Mexico. The
former were further ahead in the start-up period. In Hirschman's
terminology there was more backward linkage in Brazil. The cost of
establishing backward linkage is part of the start-up cost. HirschmanPrice Comparisons of Capital Industries 343
[6]discusses some deep-seated social reasons for limited backward
linkages, whose impact may stretch well beyond any reasonable start-up
period and will keep input costs high. Additional reasons why input
costs may be high will be discussed next.
Cost of Material In puts
An important determinant of input costs (T0 + Tb)maybe the
relative importance of the import component, since imports are often
cheaper than domestic products. Even so, imported materials may be
expensive when compared with prices paid by competing industries in
developed countries. At times the smaller LDC firms may have to pay
for smaller lots than their much larger counterparts in the industrial
countries. International firms may control the price of their inputs
and charge prices for industrial components which appear high when
compared with the cost of the final product of which they are a part.
The prethium thus charged may be higher as the imported components
are reduced.2 At the same time, material cost will go up as domestic
producers switch to domestic supplies. In some industries the cost
differential rises sharply as the domestic content begins to include the
more complex components. The size of the domestic component will
vary with the availability of local raw materials and components but
in many cases is pushed up regardless of cost consideration by gov-
ernment requirements. Thus, the excess of LDC prices over imports
may be directly related to the size of the domestic component.
The relatively high cost of materials inputs in the truck industry
makes for a sharp difference between gross and net protection. In some
cases the latter is negative, suggesting that the industry can be com-
petitive on export markets. In the production of trucks domestic costs
become especially high after the import component falls belowper
cent, both because of the deletion allowance and the excess costs of
engine, driveline, and sheet metal, especially in
Astriking feature is the high cost of imported inputs in the electrical
equipment industry, caused by high ex-duty prices paid for raw mate-
rial inputs (e.g., electrolytic copper).
It is conceivable that the high cost of inputs+ Tb) turns a low
2Inthe trade the premium takes the form of a "deletion allowance."
SCf. [7].344 Priceand Cost Differences
net protection (T3) into• a high gross protection (T1). As noted, this
appears to be the case with the truck industry. But in a larger number
of cases both T1 and T3 are high (or low) at the same time, or—put in
another way—net protection and high input costs go together. The
data suggest a high correlation between T3 and T1 and between
T3 and (Ta + Tb).4 It would seem that, in intercountry comparisons,
singling out input cost asa cost-raising factor in a way begs the ques-
tion. One suspects that in some situations the factors causing net pro-
tection to be high also operaie on input costs. These factors might be
volume of production, or exchange rate policy and the general level of
protection, which •are taken up next.
Volume of Production.
Economies of scale, important for several products, are hard to come
by in the relatively small markets of most LDC's. In many lines there
are few plant and product designs which will make for efficient opera-
tions at low volumes. Export growth, a crucial way of widening mar-
kets,isoften handicapped by excessive domestic orientationof
industry. A comparison of the electrical equipment industries of Aus-
tria and Argentina is telling. Although these industries have markets
of similar size in these countries, Austria exports two-thirds of the
output of its industry but Argentina exports none. None of the firms
from which data are presented exported to any significant extent.
The structure of the industry may further limit the volume of pro-
duction of individual firms. In fact, some countries have far too many
firms, all of them too small for efficiency. They began by providing
home producers with heavy protection. Then they sought to obtain
competition by permitting several firms under the protection umbrella.
The final result has often been high production cost and low capacity
utilization. An almost classic example is the Argentine automobile
industry, in which there are 13 manufacturers producing 68 models.
Related to economies of scale is the better capacity of larger firms to
adopt and assimilate advanced technology.
4Thecorrelation coefficient between the T3 and + Tb)seriesis R =.7018;that
between T1 and T3 is .922. While these are based on intercountry comparisons, it is
noteworthy that Lewis and Guisinger found that for Pakistan a ranking based on
gross protection would provide a reasonable approximation for one based on
effective protection (cf. [10]).Price Comparisons of Capital Industries 345
Itis well known that economies of scale are different for different
products. Least affected are the more complex products that are made
to specific order, 'such as heavy electric generators. Transformers are
another example of a product which may have modest economies of
scale. Because of the variety of products covered in the data, it is not
possible to pin-point precisely the impact of volume.
In several industries the cost of fixed plant per unit of product was
relatively low. Improvement in capacity utilization, frequently low,
would reduce the capital cost. However, for many products this factor
was outweighed by the impact of high (domestic and imported) ma-
terial cost.
Exchange Rate
The importance of appropriate exchange rate policy has been dis-
cussed extensively in the literature. From, the viewpoint of making
industrial products export-viable, it is the basic export rate of exchange
which 'counts. Thus, the maintenance of an overvalued rate does not
promote favorable cost competitiveness. This sitUation has tended to
prevail in some LDC's which have emphasized heavy industrialization,
either because overvaluation was pursued as a matter of industrializa-
tion policy (see, e.g., [7]), or the exchange rate lagged behind inflation-
ary price increases which accompanied the industrialization efforts.
The exchange rate must, of course, be considered in conjunction
with prevailing charges and subsidies on imports and exports. The
general level of" protection will depend on the level at which the ex-
change rate is fixed. In some cases the basic rate of exchange may be
accompanied by surcharges or uniform duties applicable to broad im-
port categories, while the basic rate applies to most exports. Such
'practices are not equivalent to maintaining a more depreciated basic
rate and doing without some or all of the surcharge. In the former case
the basic rate is lower and works as a penalty on exports. LDC's pro-
ducing capital goods would be especially adversely' affected,, since in
their present phase of development they are able to diversify by in-
creasing exports of new products, both manufactured and agricultural,
which may be particularly sensitive to a more favorable exchange rate.
A higher level of general protection may itself be a cause of indus-
trial inefficiency. Protection, especially when exercised through quanti-346 Priceand Cost Differences
tative controls, will shield industry from outside competition and give
it an inward orientation. This may be reflected in the structure of
industry, small production volumes, high profits, tardiness in adopting
new techniques, etc.
Among countries considered, Argentina clearly had an overvalued
basic rate at the time the data was collected. Subsequently, in 1967, it
devalued by 41 per cent. This factor accounts for a substantial part of
the high protection rates observed in Argentina. in Brazil, exchange
rate policy was to adjust the rate to domestic price changes, but the
policy was implemented stepwise (about every twelve mOnths), while
inflation proceeded at 25 to 40 per cent per annum; consequently, the
"realism" of the exchange rate was bound to erode even in a period of
months. On the other hand, as part of Brazil's stabilization efforts
manufacturers attempted to keep their own prices stable even though
the general trend was upward.
Other Factors
The impact of the factors enumerated thus far must be seen against
the background of others which may have affected the observations to
some extent.
Besides exchange rates and protection, LDC policies may influence
costs through the impact of inflation and demand stability. LDC gov-
ernments must often take measures to moderate the pace of expansion.
These measures, affecting public expenditure or credit extension,
impinge heavily on the demand for capital goods. LDC industries,
confining their sales to the home market, are not able to offset domestic
fluctuations with larger exports. Capital goods industries in the LDC's
have probably been subject to more severe fluctuations than their
counterparts in industrial countries. These fluctuations have aggra-
vated the problem of excess capacity.
High protection rates (as defined in this paper) may be associated
with (or cause)high profits per unit of product. There was some evi-
dence of this in the cost breakdown underlying the data presented.
The cost of capital (per unit of output) varied greatly frOm country
to country or product to product. It will depend on the capital inten-
siveness of the production process. The real interest rate in LDC's is,
of course, at least as high as in developed countries. The amount ofPrice Comparisons of Capital Industries 347
workingcapital required may be high in the LDC's because of the
absence of a dependable raw material supply (both domestic and im-
ported);itscosts may be high particularlyifthe manufacturer—
squeezed by inflation, with costs rising faster than finished product
prices—must rely on outside financing. Furthermore, financing of fin-
ished products, indispensable for capital equipment sales, may be more
expensive than in developed countries, if facilities for such financing
exist at all.
The cost per worker of supervisory and production staff is generally
below that in industrialized countries. But this advantage may be
offset by higher labor requirements, so labor costs per unit ,f output
may be close to or above those in industrial The share of
wages (and sometimes also profits) in total costs may rise in the infla-
tionary process—this may account for the relatively high nonmaterial
component of the Argentine products on which observations were
made.
It has not been possible to make a comparison of the share of wages
in the total cost. The data available often pertain to firms which in
turn have greatly different product mixes.
The LDC cost of selling and distribution (per unit of output) also
is usually above (sometimes double) that in industrial countries.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The price differential between LDC's and industrial countriesis
influenced by many factors. These factors or combinations of them
apply in widely varying intensities. Consequently, there are wide
differences in price differentials for individual products among coun-
5Forexample, following are data on direct labor requirements of three Brazilian




(1) (2) (1) +(2)
Diesel generator,
1,500 KVA; 900 rpm 1,850 600 3.1
Transformer, 300 KVA;
220/88 KV 9,880 4,100 2.4
Water.wheel generator,
42 MVA; 13,820 V 28,000 16,000 1.75348 Priceand Cost Differences
tries or for various products in individual countries. No hard and fast
rules seem to exist whereby countries or industries can be classified as
to their competitiveness in the manufacture of capital goods.
Any new firm or industry must incur special costs in getting estab-
lished. Most of these costs are commonly associated with infant indus-
tries: the training of labor and management, the working-in of the
plant and adaptation of the production process to local conditions,
opening of supplier and marketing channels, development of supplier
industries, etc. In LDC's these costs are bound to be higher and may be
stretched over a longer period than in industrial countries with whose
products the LDC firm must compete. Unless special provisions are
made to finance start-up costs, they will be reflected in the final price;
the price differential between local and imported products will then
often be substantial. The level and duration of start-up costs vary with
the individual firm, industry, and country.
After an initial starting-up period the costs of establishing the indus-
try will be eliminated or at least greatly reduced. The prices of the
final product will become more in line with import prices. However,
inherent in the basic conditions or prevailing policies of many LDC's
are several factors which may work to keep their prices well above
comparable import prices.
These factors fall into two broad categories. The first are those
which may be influenced by appropriate changes in government policy,
e.g., exchange rate adjustment, diminished reliance on direct controls,
moderation in domestic content requirements, stabilization of public
procurement and investment credit. Secondly, there are factors—asso-
ciated with the hard-core infant-economy argument—which will change
only as the economy becomes more developed: scarcity of skills, man-
agement, and capital; high cost of services, supplies, and material
inputs; high-risk factors; lagging technology; low production volumes.
There will be a gray area between these two categories, which may be
narrowed by government policies, but which will also be affected by
the attitude or actions of industry itself and the progress made in
establishing the basic conditions for modern industry. A further con-
sideration is the increasing efficiency of some industries in developed
countries, reflected in faIling prices during the past five to ten years.
As the start-up period is completed, infant-economy factors will tendPrice Comparisons of Capital Industries 849
tooutweigh the factors associated with a particular infant industry.
Moreover, factors considered internal to a particular firm may also
reflect countrywide conditions and affect other firms and industries.
Generally, the more competitive LDC industries are those which
have effectively incurred the initial costs of getting established, are
located in countries where there is a reasonably realistic exchange rate
and where the number of firms in the industry is not so large as to
cause unduly low production volumes in individual firms. Even where
this combination of favorable factors prevails, infant-economy factors
may impinge on LDC competitiveness, and it is not uncommon to find
price differentials up to 15—25 per cent.
Much empirical work currently in progress is based on industry
aggregates. However, the data on individual products presented here
suggest great variation within the industries. It is worthwhile to check
the findings based on industry studies against those pertaining to
individual products. Perhaps one ought to be more cautious about
broad tariff policy conclusions based on industry aggregates. Certainly,
proposals for individual tariffs must be based on studies of individual
products.
The data in this paper make possible some intercountry comparisons
for similar products. Although industry in the countries selected is in
different stages of development, the differences in protection observed
are caused also by other factors, such as the structure of industry and
exchange rate policy. The conclusions should be substantiated further
by studies of the development of industry or production of individual
products over a period of time. After a five-year lapse it would be
worthwhile to take a repeat look at the firms and products studied here.
The high cost of inputs is an important cost-raising factor for some
(e.g., the automotive) but not all industries studied here. The data
suggest a close correlation between net and gross protection and be.
tween the net protection of finished goods and the protection of inputs
used in the production of these finished goods. This points to the im-
portance of factors operating on the whole industrial sector or even
the economy. This is particularly relevant to the formulation of "mini-
mum conditions" which, as suggested above, should refer in part to
conditions for the economy as a whole.350 Priceand Cost Differences
REFERENCES
1. H. G. Johnson. "The Theory of Tariff Structure, with Special Reference
to World Trade and Development." In Trade and Development. Geneva,
1965.
2. "Tariffs and Economic Development." Journal of Development
Studies, October 1965.
3. Michael Bruno. "The Optimal Selection of Export-promoting and Import-
substitutingProjects."U.N. Interregional Seminar on Development
Planning. Ankara, Turkey, September 1965.
4. Bela Balassa. "Tariff Protection in industrial Countries: An Evaluation."
Journal of Political Economy, December 1965.
5. Barend A. de Vries. The Export Experience of Developing Countries.
World Bank Staff Papers No. 3. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.
6. Albert 0. Hirschman. "The Political Economy of Import-Substituting
Industrialization in Latin America." Quarterly Journal of Economics,
February 1968.
7. Jack Baranson. Automotive Industries in Developing Countries. World
Bank Occasional Papers. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1969.
8. Ayhan Cilingiroglu. Manufacture of Heavy Electrical Equipment in De-
veloping Countries. World Bank Occasional Papers. Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins Press, 1969.
9. Celso Furtado. "Industrialization .and Inflation." International Economic
Papers XII, 1967.
10. Stephen R. Lewis Jr. and Stephen E. Guisinger. "Measuring Protection in




My initial reaction to de Vries's paper was, What is there for me to
say? The two World Bank studies, Automotive Industries in Develop-
ing Countries and of Heavy Electrical Equipment
Developing Countries, are chock-full of hard-to-get information on
comparative prices and costs for carefully specified individual products
of these two industries; consequently, one can only urge the bank's
economics staff to exploit further its unique entree to individual firm
data and give us more such valuable studies. Dc Vries's referral to these
data is wrapped in appropriate warnings about their limitations as a
basis for broad explanations of the difficulties that LDC's encounterPrice Comparisons of Capital Industries 351
intrying to move from industrial import substitution to industrial
exporting. His analysis of those difficulties is equally qualified, cau-
tiously incorporating most of the conventional explanations without
seemingly committing himself on their relative importance. And to
cap it all he concludes with a plea for more data. How to uncover
grounds in all this blandness for some sort of scholarly confrontation?
I think I have found such grounds. It took some additional readings
and a rather unfair stripping away of caveats and qualifications to
uncover them, but unfairness is, after all, part of the style of confronta-
tion politics. At any rate, it enables me to move from the uncustomary
role of praise-singer to the more comfortable one of critic.
Ruthlessly and unfairly stripped of its qualifications, de Vries's
rather optimistic diagnosis of LDC industrial exporting problems is
the following.
1. Although unit costs and prices of most LDC industrial products
are too high for profitable exporting, this is in part because the cost
of final products is substantially increased by heavy duties on imported
materials and high rates of protection of domestically produced
materials.
2. Independently of import liberalization measures, however, domes-
tic unit costs can still be expected to converge in time toward c.i.f.
prices in the LDC's as
a. High start-up costs are overcome and operative experience im-
proves efficiency at the firm level;
b. The growth of the home market permits greater exploitation
of economies of scale and extensions of backward linkages;
c.Physical and human capital and external economies accumu-
late pan passu with the further economic development of the
LDC's.
3. The favorable cost-price trends can be hastened by adopting more
"realistic"(i.e., lower) exchange rates and more liberal commercial
policies,i.e., lower tariffs and fewer quantitative import controls.
There is ample room for this, since the LDC's manifest a penchant for
"overvalued" exchange rates and excessive protection and controls.
The first general point finds ample support in de Vries's Table 1.
Although only one of the twenty-eight products has an LDC domestic
price below the c.i.f. import price, the number would rise to seven if352 Priceand Cost Differences
all material inputs could be obtained at the estimated c.i.f. prices (and
•provided, one should add, that the shift to foreign sources of materials
would not require firms to hold substantially higher inventory levels).
There is, however, more in the table that is relevant to the diagnosis
of export potential. For example, although for 15 of the 28 products
the cost of imported materials is a higher percentage of final price
than is the cost of domestic materials, lowering domestic material
prices to c.i.f. levels would nevertheless reduce the cost of the final
product much more than would lowering imported material prices to
c.i.f. levels. In other words, the nub of the high materials cost obstacle
lies in high protection of domestic rather than imported materials. All
four LDC's seem in fact to have been pursuing the standard mercantil-
ist strategy of keeping protection levels high for competitive imports
and low for noncompetitive ones. This is indicated in Table 1 by the
distribution of values for (T1 —T2)/T1and (T2 —T3)/T1.In fact,
Table 1 probably understates the ubiquitousness of the strategy, since
TABLE 1
Percentage Decline of Unit Costs of Products in de Vries's Table 1,
with Imported and Domestic Materials at C,I.F. Prices a
0—10% 11—20% 21—30% Over 30%
Decline with Imported Materialsat
C.I.F. Prices—(T1 —T2)/T1
Argentina 3 3 0 0
Brazil 3. 0 0 1
Mexico 6 1 0 6
Pakistan 1 1 1 0
Total 13 5 1
Decline with Domestic Materials
C.I.F. Prices—(T2 —T3)/T1
at
Argentina 0 2 2 2
Brazil 0 2 1 1
Mexico 1 1 4 7
Pakistan 0 0 1 2
Total 1 5 8 12
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ofthe seven (T1 —T2)/T1items in the 30 per cent group, over six are
heavy electrical equipment products whose main domestic buyers, the
state-owned utilities, are generally constrained by law and political
pressures to buy national.1
Table 1 thus suggests two reasons why the convergence of domestic
and c.i.f. prices may be a more difficult accomplishment than is implied
by de Vries's rather optimistic prognosis. The first is that the easier
sort of import liberalization—the lowering of duties on noncompeti-
tive imports—would contribute far less to convergence than would
lowering protection on competitive imports, while the latter, though
contributing more• toward reducing costs, would also drastically dis-
rupt industrial employment and output, at least transitionally, and
hence would be a difficult feat to pull off politically. The second is that
whatever contribution extending backward linkages may make to
employment and foreign exchange saving, it appears to raise rather
than lower production costs of final products. This is contrary to the
implications of de Vries's analysis, although to be fair, he seems to be
of two minds on this. This is further indicated by regressions of gross
protection, T1, and net protection,on the ratio of imported mate-
rials cost to total unit cost, a/p (columns 7 and 9 on column 3 in the
de Vries's Table 1).
T1 =86.883—1.186(a/p)R2 =0.155
(2.280)
T3 =49.901—0.8895(a/p) R2 =0.153
(2.198)
The negative relationships are not strong, but are significant at the
95 per cent confidence level. As an added bonus, the similarity of the
two regressions indicates that the net or effective rates of protection
correlatefairlyclosely with the gross rates forthe twenty-eight
products.
The c.i.f. prices of de Vries's table have been estimated via the
assumption that removing formal protection would suffice' to lower the
1Themain exceptions occur when the capital goods purchases of the utility
companies involve financing, eithersuppliers'creditsor World Bank
financing. In the latter case the bank requires competitive bidding, with only a
maximum 15 per cent preference margin to domestic bidders.354 Price'and Cost Differences
prices of imported materials, intermediate products, and, equipment
to levels roughly competitive with those of producers in advanced
countries. How justified is this assumption? Let me cite some contrary
evidence from pre-Worid War II Argentina, from an era when, as we
know, the right people, guided by the sacred tenets of economic liberal-
ism, still ruled that country and the efficient Argentine price structure
had not yet succumbed to the onslaughts of Peronist policies, that root
cause of Argentina's poor postwar economic performance, according to
the conservative devil theory of Argentine stagnation. Table 2 indi-
cates that for at least four high-volume capital goods imports, tariffs,
custom fees, and carriage costs 'explain only a modest fraction of the
excess of the Argentine wholesale price over the U.S. wholesale price.
The neoclassical revival, from 'which' 'we are, 'hopefully, beginning to
recover, has tended to blind us to' the importance of differences in
market structure and pricing strategies as causes of sustained differences
in relative prices.
Further evidence on this is supplied by Table 3, which is a summary
prewar comparative price information for an array of internationally
tradable industrial commodities, some actually imported by Argentina
and some home produced. The variance of Argentine from U.S. rela-
tive prices appears substantially larger than can be explained by trans-
port costs, tariff duties, and differences in indirect taxes. Moreover,
TABLE 2
Ratios of Argentine to U.S., Wholesale Prices of Four
Argentine Capital Goods Imports, 1939
, Ratio Net of Argentine
C.l.F. Costs
. and









SouRcE: ArmourResearch Foundation, Technological and Economic Survey of Ar-
gentine Industries; Buenos Aires, 1943, Table XII.Price Comparisons of Capital Industries 355
TABLE 3
Ratio of U.S. to Argentine Purchasing Power of Cattle and Wheat
for Selected Commodities, 1937 and 1939
Terms-of-Trade Ratios, U.S. to Argentina a
Cattle Wheat
1937 1939 1937 1939
Wool cloth 440 367 119 175
Cotton denim — 582 156 269
Sulphuric acid 939 568 245 262
Caustic soda 551 564 144 259
Denatured alcohol 756 541 198 249
Kraft paper 402 250 193 194
Coal 836 757 219 249
Fuel oil 410 293 107 134
Gasoline . 1,821 1,480 476 731
Steel rails 602 458 156 214
Electrolytic copper 541 501 143 232
Lumber 570 436 149 200
Cement 500 129 —
Automobile — 412 — 306
Radio receiver — — — 342
Tractor — 580 — 273
Combine (12-ft.) — 669 — 314
Mowing machine — 906 — 416
Plow — 611 — 281
SouRcE: Armour Research Foundation, Survey, Tables XIII and XV.
aFor cattle: ÷ (P,IPc)a;forwheat: where p, designates
wholesale prices of selected industrial products; PC,theprice of live cattle;the price
ofwheat; usrefers to the United States; and a refers to Argentina.
one can detect in these prewar price ratios the main outlines—though
with some deviations—of the Argentine relative price structure of the
1960's, the intercession of Peron and excessive import substitution
notwithstanding.2 Alternatively, there is little evidence of convergence
2 For detailed 1960's relative prices see Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA), "A Measurement of Price Levels and the Purchasing Power of Currencies in
Latin America, 1960—62," mimeo, Santiago, Chile, March 1969.356 Priceand Cost Differences
between domestic and c.i.f. industrial prices in Argentina during the
past three decades, learning curves and capital and skill accumulation
notwithstanding.
Tables 2 and 3, however, also modify some of the negative implica-
tions of backward linkage suggested by Table 1. They suggest that the
margin of maneuver for LDC industrialization strategy is probably
much more circumscribed than is implied by the de Vries paper. The
potential range of choice for industrial users is not between high
materials prices under protection and "competitive" c.i.f.-level prices
under free trade, but perhaps a much narrower range reflecting struc-
turally embedded market imperfections. The prewar price tables may
also help explain why indignation at the high relative prices of various
import substitutes in the LDC's tends to be greater among visiting
economists than among the local citizenry. The latter have been
partly inured by high relative prices of the corresponding imports
during the pre-import substitution years.
What about more "realistic" exchange rates as a means of hastening
the convergence of domestic and c.i.f. prices? Facile references to "over-
valued" or "unrealistic" exchange rates grossly overestimate, it seems
to me, the ability of economic authorities to sustain a major alteration
of the ratio of domestic to international prices by means of a few
simple macropolicy devices. The evidence for Argentina—not untypical
of industrializing LDC's at least in this regard—is that the short-term
price elasticities of demand for imports and supply elasticities of
agricultural exportables are very low, that the chief mechanism of
adjustment has had to be sectoral income shifts combined with a drop
in aggregate and that domestic prices tend to rebound
quickly,4 unless special political conditions permit the preservation of
the income shifts and/or the recession long enough for the sluggish
long-run supply elasticities to take hold. The "realistic" 40 per cent
devaluation, in March 1967, approvingly cited by de Vries, is a recent
illustration of the last point. It did take until spring 1970 for Argen-
3Cf.Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, Exchange Rate Devaluation in a Semi-Industrialized
Country, M.I.T. Press, 1965; Richard Mallon, "Exchange Policy—Argentina," in G.
Papanek, ed., Development Policy: Theory and Practice, Harvard University Press,
1968, pp. 175—206.
4ArnoldHarberger, "The Effects of Inflation on the Price Level," in W. Baer
and I. Kerstenetsky, eds., Inflation and Economic Growth, New York, 1964.Price Comparisons of Capital Industries 357
tinewholesale prices to rebound the full 40 per cent, but this rebound-
ing period, unusually long by previous Argentine experiences with
devaluation, was elongated by a military regime that sat hard on
money wages to the point of lowering real wages, until the social
upheavals of May 1969 forced an easing of wage controls. And yet it
seems doubtful that even a three-year rebounding period is to
allow resource reallocations in Argentina to gain adequate monentum.
Be that as it may, the essential argument is that since changes in rela-
tive prices also affect income distribution, the changes will, according
to the organized strength of discommoded groups operating both in
the market place and the political arena, set in motion countervailing
price reactions to restore status quo ante price relationships. This may,
in turn, thwart the desired reallocation, unless supply responses to
relative price changes are quick and elastic, a behavioral characteristic
for which LDC's are not widely noted.
The emphasis on the convergence of comparative production costs
would suggest that LDC industrial exporting should originate and gain
momentum from the relatively low-cost, low-technology, and low-
capital-intensive side of the industrial product gamut, rather than
from the high-technology side where the twenty-eight products of the
de Vries paper are situated. The actual export pattern, however, seems
more mixed. To illustrate let me summarize some paradoxical findings
I have obtained from a study of Argentine nontraditional industrial
exporting.5 These are:
1. Around 60 per cent of these exports in 1963—66 originated in
industries with above-average capital intensity, •the percentage being
similar for exports to the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA) and for those to the rest of the world.
2. The industries originating these exports were in the upper half
of the Argentine relative industrial price spectrum.
3. Multiple regressions showed •the variance of nontraditional ex-
ports for 1955—66 to be unrelated to variations in exchange rates,
whether lagged or unlagged (the exchange rates were adjusted to
incorporate the differential tax subsidies applicable to various cate-
gories of nontraditional exports).
5DavidFelix, "Subsidies, Depression and Non-traditional -Industrial Exporting in
Argentina," Harvard University Development Advisory Service, Economic Develop-
ment Report No. 107, September 1968.358 Priceand Cost Differences
4. Export variance, on the other hand, was significantly related to
variations of excess capacity of the respective industries and to the
establishment of LAFTA in the 1960's.
Spasmodic respect for côniparative cost doctrine makes me skeptical
that Argentina's destiny is to become an important exporter of high-
and capital-intensive industrial products in the next few
decades. The skepticism is reinforced by an awareness that marketing
costs are especially high for this range of products, as are also the levels
of marketing sophistication, research and development outlays, and
risk required to compete effectively in high-technology production with
producers in developed Argentine nontraditional exporting
was, after all, still a marginal activity—5 to 6 per cent of total exports—
during the period covered by the study, and it is possible that after
further shaking out, a quite different longer-run pattern may emerge
than that manifested in the twelve years covered by the study.
The twelveyear pattern did conform, however, to the aspirations of
the economic authorities and more interestingly, to the expectations of
the Argentine business community in 1960's. The industrial pro-
motioh measures of this period were strongly biased toward encourag-
ing the export of sophisticated products of recently established indus-
tries, rather than the less technologically exacting products of longer-
established ones. Similarly, Argentine trade association executives, when
asked in a 1963 survey to predict the chief sources of future Argentine
industrial exports, chose high-technology industries such as machinery,
motor vehicles and tractors, and organic chemicals, citing as the main
reasons for their choice, in order of frequency: (1) current excess capac-
ity;(2) minimal production by other LAFTA countries;(3) future
excess capacity; (4) progressive management. Cost competitiveness was
virtually ignored despite the urging Of the interviewer to give it major
weight.8
The implications for LDC industrial export prognosis to be ex-
tracted from this limited Argentine evidence are: (1) Firms that pro-
gress from high-cost import substitution to import competitiveness—and
many, of course, do not—need not therefore move on to exporting.
José M. Dagnino Pastore, Productos Exportables: Resultados de Encuestas
(Docümento de Trabajo), Buenos Aires, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1964.Price Comparisons of Capital Industries 359
(2)Firms that are tuned into well-established foreign market channels,
whether as subsidiaries of international corporations or through other
foreign ties, may export despite high unit costs,if exporting helps
relieve excess capacity, or fits some short- or long-term international
production or marketing strategy of the parent corporation. In gen-
eral, the assumption that if the price is right exporting will follow
may be a particularly unreliable basis for predicting industrial export-
ing patterns of LDC's.
It has become a commonplace to decry the inadequacy of the theoret-
ical framework guiding analyses and policy prescriptions concerning
LDC trade and economic development. The recurring balance-of-
payments crises afflicting most LDC's, particularly the industrializing
ones, have been seemingly impervious to long-run solutions via the
orthodox trade and exchange policy prescriptions of economic liberal-
ism. In just about all of the industrializing LDC's the industrial sector
has substantially increased its share of GNP but not its share of
employment. Mounting urban underemployment has become a key
manifestation of new forms of socioeconomic dualism. I suspect that
for Mexico, Pakistan, and Brazil—three of the four industrializing
LDC's in the de Vries survey—the before and after income distribution
pattern can reasonably be described by an intersecting pair of Lorenz
curves reflecting little change in the Gini inequality index, as in Figure
1: The growth of the middle class and industrial worker cohorts are
offset by a drop in the relative income status of the income recipients
in the lower half of the distribution.
Let me conclude, however, on a positive note, by briefly suggesting
a neglected aspect of trade and growth analysis that may indicate one
of the paths toward a more relevant theoretical framework. There are
two fundamental tenets on which the propositions of international
trade theory have been erected. One is that countries can be viewed as
decision making units writ large, with well-ordered and autonomously
determined preference functions and sharing common and exogenously
determined menus of goods and techniques. The other tenet is that
trade is an engine of growth, a dynamic cultural force leading to the
introduction of previously unknown goods, wants, and technology from
without.






the• welfare propositions and the policy prescriptions,whereasthe
second has mainly added rhetorical flourishes to international trade
textbooks. Yet the analytic implicationsof the second tenet are pro-
foundly disturbing for the theorems derived fromthe first. In effect,
they could render many of them empirically irrelevant. For example,
unless all goods are only gross substitutes—a proposition that would
destroy the basis for aggregation—the introduction of new goods will
alter the elasticity of substitution in consumption between older goods,
so that before-and-after community indifference curves cross and
judgments of the gains from trade have to rely on additional and more
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directad hoc measures of socioeconomic welfare to supplement flawed
aggregate indexes like changes in GNP per capita.
We are increasingly aware of various forces affecting LDC trade and
economic growth trends that have not been handled convincingly with
our conventional tools of analysis, particularly as these are constrained
in their use by widely shared if largely implicit behavioral and ideo-
logical assumptions about economic behavior. But we still try to com-
fort ourselves by pigeon-holing contradictory behavioral manifesta-
tions and persistentdifficultiesof the LDC',sas"transitional."
Something like this, I suspect, may underlie the optimistic tenor of
de Vries's prognosis of LDC industrial exporting prospects. Yet when
countries ranging from Pakistan, with less than $100 per capita income,
to Argentina, with over $800 per capita income, are used to illustrate
common industrial inefficiencies and exporting difficulties, the assump-
tion that the difficulties dwindle away as income and productive
capacity rise seems little more than an analytic copout.
The tendency has been to get around such difficulties by aggregating
goods into broader classes, so that the auto and the oxcart lose their
individuality in the category, transportation goods, and by assuming a
symmetrical flow of influences between trading countries which does
not affect the time-shape of preference functions. But aggregation
buries as well as summarizes, and for some issues the buried informa-
tion may be critical. Thus the fact that the auto is an import-intensive
substitute for the oxcart could be quite important in analyzing em-
ployment and balance-of-payments problems in LDC's. As for sym-
metry of influence, it is obviously not inherent in trade and communi-
cation, but only one possibility.
Symmetry may not be an intolerable simplifying assumption for the
analysis of contemporary trade between advanced countries, although
the Vernon product cycle trade model suggests that the dynamics of
industrial trade in a world of multinational corporations may be better
explained by introducing asymmetrical influences. Possibly the analysis
of nineteenth-century trade between the technologically advanced
countries of that epoch can also be based on the simplifying assumption
of symmetry of influence with only moderate damage to the relevance
of the analysis. For despite British technological leadership, there was
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international communications grew, there was also a growing inter-
change of consumer tastes, French consumption patterns being partly
anglicized, British patterns somewhat gallicized, etc.
For LDC's, however, the influence flow has been patently one-way.
The older export economy dualism models of the Myint type rest, for
example, on asymmetrical technological and taste intrusions from
without. But so also do the new forms of dualism associated with LDC
industrialization. Import substitution can be viewed in this regard as
a strategy of shifting the external technological and demand influences
from the import structure to the productive structure of the industrial-
izing LDC.
Confronted by accumulating evidence that LDC's are importing
excessively labor-saving techniques, economists have tended to view
the problem exclusively from the production function perspective.
There ought to be a more labor-intensive least-cost way, they seem to
be saying, of producing petrochemicals, motor cars, and TV picture
tubes than the imported techniques actually employed. Yet the fact
seems to be that both locally owned firms and foreign subsidiaries in
the LDC find it more profitable and less risky to import packaged tech-
nologies and product designs than to incur the costs and risks of doing
indigenous R and D on production processes and of pioneering in
indigenous product development; hence LDC producers of even high-
technology products do very little of either.
If, however, we dispense with the notion that the changing final
demand mixes in the LDC's reflect only autonomous forces that can be
fully analyzed under the rubric of price and income elasticity, we may
come up with a more persuasive explanation of the perverse choice of
techniques by the LDC's. That is to say, the choice may be as much a
demand mix as a production function phenomenon.
The regressions of the 1965 stock of TV receivers per 100 persons
on per capita income for OECD and for Latin American countries,
illustrate the point. Although the TV set is a more recently introduced
artifact with a much higher relative price in Latin America than in
Europe, the regression coefficient is similar for each group of countries
and the intercept is considerably smaller for the Latin American group.
I suspect similar patterns illuminating the international demonstra-
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tal-intensiveconsumer items. We mightalso,perhaps, uncover
significant differences among LDC's in the strength of the effect, and
explore whether these differences correlate with the relative vigor of
consumer indoctrination, as measured by the relative importance of
foreign subsidiaries in the LDC industrial sector or the relative per-
suasiveness of Americanized sales promotion techniques, as indicated
by the ratio of advertising outlays to sales, the uses of TV and radio,
and similar indexes. For example, the much greater strength of these
influence channels in Latin America compared to the Third World
as a whole for equivalent per capita income classes may help explain
why Latin American countries, although in the higher ranges of per
capita income in the Third World, stiffer with at least equal intensity
from the new dualism with its inequalities, growing underemployment,
and persistent balance-of-payments impediments to growth.
With these asymmetrical influences, liberal trading rules become
double-edged. They do not merely promote a more efficient specializa-
tion of LDC's in the production of a subset of an exogenously deter-
mined menu of goods, but also maximize the channels through which
the one-way international demonstration effect enriches the menu and
twists preferences in indigestion-prone directions.
Given any double-edged situation, an economist instinctively thinks
of some optimum trade-off. In this case, the trade-off could be a set of
controls which selectively meters the influence flow so as to minimize
unemployment and balance-of-payments distortions. This seems to be
the direction toward which the economic policy of many LDC's, beset
by these problems, seems to be tending. Crude and lurching though
these policy trends may be, they may nevertheless have a more rational
economic basis than conventional analysis has been willing to grant.
Another possible arrangement could be one-way trade concessions by
advanced countries to make amends for the vigor of their one-sided
cultural impact on the LDC's. The growing popularity of this pioy
among trade economists has to be viewed, so far, as a victory for benev-
olence over existing theology. We could, however, do the Lord's work
with less theological angst if we would recognize that it is the theology,
not the benevolence, which may be analytically inappropriate to the
situation.364 Priceand Cost Differences
DOROTHY WALTERS, Economic Council of Canada
In respecting the constraint which time imposes on us this morning,
I shall comment only briefly from some notes made during the confer-
ence. To begin with, I should like to express my regret that Barend
de Vries was not able to be present at this session to discuss his interest-
ing paper. Baranson has given us an admirable presentation; neverthe-
less one is left with the unsatisfied wish to "confront" the author him-
self.
Many participants at this meeting with experience in the collection
and analysis of international price data will findit interesting to
examine the tabular data on capital goods prices. The de Vries com-
parison of domestic and international prices allows us to look at the
impact of prices of domestically produced and imported materials on
gross price differences. The data for four countries and twenty-six
items are too sparse to provide other than a rough indication of wide
price differences among commodities and between countries. As
de Vries pointed out, data should be interpreted with care" and
"proposals for individual tariffs must be based on studies of individual
products." It may be that the two forthcoming World Bank studies
by Baranson and Cilingiroglu will provide a broader statistical base
for more general policy conclusions.
In his discussion paper, Felix neatly summarized the data to high-
light one not surprising conclusion—that price differences of domesti-
cally produced inputs are a more important factor in gross or final
price differences than imported input prices. This raises a number of
questions concerning productivity in the supplying industries, and the
relative size of tariffs on the domestic materials industries compared
to those on imported inputs. The special comparison raises questions
of the relevance of the exchange rates for conversion. The Grunwald
and Salazar paper deals particularly with the problem of evaluating
competitiveness to take account of differences in price levels and equi-
librium exchange rates in Latin America. Earlier this morning a com-
ment by Ruggles reminded me of the Braithwaite-Dias price compari-
sons, which showed high prices in the Argentine and a number ofPrice Comparisons of Capital Industries 365
otherLatin American countries for capital compared to other goods.
There are other interesting points raised by these data, for example,
the relatively high price of imported inputs for truck production. Does
this reflect a peculiarity of the parent-subsidiary relationship which
has wider relevance? Are the differences in the value-added prices
related to labor or capital costs, or are they a function of efficiency, of
market size, or of the degree of product specialization?
The data and the substance of underlying relationships would pro-
vide a better basis for understanding the price differences for capital
goods which the de Vries paper sets out. But the whole thrust of the
discussion around this point yesterday suggested that there may be
serious limitations to drawing policy conclusions from this type of static
price comparison about the effects of changes in tariffs or rates of
exchange on scale, competitiveness, or resource allocation. Indeed, as
the discussion between Balassa and Bhagwati suggested, there is still
room for controversy about the relationship among productivity,
prices, and exports.
De Vries has set out a short but comprehensive statement of the
range of factors which affect price and competitiveness. As Baranson
noted in his presentation, the next, but crucial, step is to assess the
relative importance of these factors, before policy prescriptions be-
come evident. Felix has already discussed some of the practical diffi-
culties associated with the suggestion that tariff reductions provide a
realistic answer to achieving a more competitive capital goods industry
in the less developed countries. The paper by Ranis also emphasized
the forces which act to preserve the established infant-industry "hot-
house" environment.
Finally, I should like to re-emphasize a point already made by
Felix. There is, among the less developed countries, a strong reversion
to job creation as a prime goal of economic development. This may
offend many economic sensibilities. But if it be true that the political,
social, or economic circumstances require that employment become a
priority goal, we should, perhaps, be evolving those "second-best"
theories and prescriptions which take account of these realities and
minimize the economic loss. It may be necessary to seek what Ranis
has called "efficiency promotion" without abandoning the growth
and commercial policy aspects of the infant-industry syndrome. As366 Price and Cost Differences
development policies become oriented to absorbing larger numbers
of workers into the industrial mainstream, we may have to prescribe
for what Bhagwati called "import substitution in an optimal way."
We live in a world of multiple goals, and growing awareness of their
conflict and interrelations may further constrain optimality and effi-
ciency.
REPLY BY JACK BARANSON FOR DE VRIES
1. On the point that the narrow sampling of individual industrial
products does not give us an adequate basis for the conclusions drawn
in the paper, I would agree that this is a legitimate criticism. As I
pointed out in my presentation of the paper, there is a basic problem in
making international cost comparisons. It relates to the comparability
of items included and to the cost accounting systems used in different
national environments. Using aggregated data fOr product groups runs
the analyst into the difficult problems of comparing different baskets
of goods (in terms of model variations, quality, or performance charac-
teristics).
In the automotive products study, it was possible to get compara-
bility among products manufactured in different national environments
only by selecting near-identical vehicle models manufactured by a
multinational firm with comparability among national accounting
systems. Even within this common framework, adjustments had to be
made for noncomparability in near-identical truck models, anomolies
among accounting systems, and quality differences among national
products.
2. Another criticism leveled at the paper is that the analysis does
not tell us where the cost differences lie. These could be attributed to
(a) differences in taxes and tariffs;(b) exchange rate anómolies; (c)
varying operations. These differences are not articulated in the de Vries
paper but have been dealt with in some depth in the automotive and
electrical equipment studies cited there. The same applies to insights
on the competitive position of capital goods industries, which are
treated more definitely in the cited studies.
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and overvalued exchange are the basic causes of high manufacturing
costs. In a sense, we are dealing with a tautology, in that high costs are
the creature of protection linked to an overvalued exchange rate, but
the reverse is also true. It is true, as I indicated earlier in my remarks
on the Ranis paper, that once industrialization under import substi-
tution is carried to an extensive and excessive degree, cost efficiencies
are undermined in other industries, including those that are export
oriented. However, I do not believe that the prescription of "low-cost,
low-technology" industries can be applied generally. The fact is that
Argentina has exported $50 million to $100 million a year of fairly
sophisticated industrial equipment, including machine lathes and
IBM sorting machines. The chief disadvantages that manufacturing
plants in developing countries face are scale and the dearth of supplier
industries. If a plant manufactures at near-international scale, and if
the country's trade policy allows a firm to import the high-cost range
of materials and parts, a fairly broad range of manufacturing oppor-
tunities is feasible, including elements of the more complex engineer-
ing goods and capital equipment.'
1SeeJack Baranson, Manufacturing Problems in India, Syracuse University Press,
1967, pp. 110ff.